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NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER, his Wife,

..
.

Respondents,
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vs.
F. CARL FARNSWORTH and
ANN H. FARNSWORTH, his Wife;
and JON LEE TORGERSON and
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Case No. 18142

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an equitable action brought by Respondents
for specific enforcement of a Uniform Real Estate Contract
entered into by and between the parties.
II.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The Sixth Judicial District Court granted Respondents'
Motion for Summary Judgment requiring Appellants to transfer
title to certain real property to Respondents upon payment by
Respondents to Appellants of certain sums, each party to bear
its own costs and attorney's fees.
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III.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants ask this Court to reverse the judgment of
the district court in toto, remanding the matter for trial.
Respondents, by way of cross-appeal, also seek the reversal
of the judgment of the district court insofar as said court
refused to grant an award of costs and attorney's fees in
favor of Respondents.

Further, Respondents ask this Court to

award costs and attorney's fees in favor of Respondents on
this appeal.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In their initial Brief, Appellants set forth a
concise Statement of relevant Facts supported by the record
on file herein.

Notwithstanding Respondents' objections

thereto, Appellants believe that said Statement accurately
relates only relevant and material facts including those to
which counsel for Respondents stipulated at the hearing held
on October 16, 1981.

(Transcript 22).

Additional facts set

forth in Respondents' Brief, while fairly accurate, tend to
confuse the simple issues rather than isolate them.

Therefore

Appellants will rely on their prior proffered Statement.
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A.

!~ •

ARGUMENT

DEMONSTRATED BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE
WRITING ITSELF AND THE PARTIES'
CONDUCT THEREUNDER, AMBIGUITIES EXIST
IN THE "THORPE" CONTRACT THAT REQUIRE
THE ADMISSION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
TO RESOLVE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT.

The basic legal principles concerning the relationship
of ambiguities and the parol

evidence rule have been ably

presented in both Appellants' and Respondents' Briefs.

The

remaining question concerns applicability to the "Thorpe"
Contract of those recited principles.

Appellants do not seek

to have the Court "torture words and phrases to import
ambiguity," nor do they expect such a finding at the mere
urging of "differing contract interpretations."
Brief at 8.)

(Respondents'

Rather, Appellants request that the Court

examine the contractual language of the "Thorpe" Contract to
ascertain what those written words stand for in connection
with the particular conduct of the parties.

E. A. Strout

Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick 522 P.2d 144, 146
(Utah 1974).
In determining whether an ambiguity exists in a
document, the test lies, not necessarily in the presence of
isolated ambiguous words or phrases, but in whether or not
those otherwise plain words become uncertain when applied to
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the subject matter of the instrument.
Evidence § 1069 (1967).

30 Am. Jur. 2d,

It is generally held that "latent"

ambiguities may be clarified by parol

evidence.

Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95 P.2d 752, 753 (1939).

Kennedy v.
A

latent

ambiguity is an uncertainty which does not appear on the face
of the instrument, but which is shown to exist for the first
time by matter outside the writing.
§

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence

1073 (1967).
Utah has historically recognized the need to accept

extrinsic evidence to explain a latent ambiguity in a writing,
This Court in Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82
Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 (1932), stated:
One well-recognized exception to the
rule is that extrinsic evidence, parol or
otherwise, is admissible to explain a
latent ambiguity in a writing. This does
not mean that terms or conditions may be
inserted into or taken out of the writing
by direct oral assertions, but it does
mean that the court may receive evidence
of such surrounding facts as will enable
it to look upon the transaction through
the eyes of the parties thereto and
thereby know what they understood or
intended the ambiguous word or provisions
to mean.
The Court went on to remark that where the conduct of the
parties pursuant to a written agreement demonstrate an
ambiguity in the interpretation of said agreement, it is
"necessary for the court to know as much as the parties at
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the time of signing knew about the subject matter."

This

enables the court, "so far as necessary, to see the transaction
through the eyes and understanding of the parties."

Id.

Although old law, Fox Film continues to be valid law
in Utah.

In Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20, 22

(1965) 1 this Court followed precedent and held that parol
evidence was admissible,

notwithstanding the clear and

otherwise certain language of the agreement, to show that the
actions of the parties demonstrated ambiguity in the intended
contractual relationship.
Defendants argue that the terms of the
April 6, 1932, agreement are unambiguous and
provide for a present sale as of that date,
and that parol evidence cannot alter or
change its plain meaning. This is generally
true, but there are exceptions; one of which
is that when the parties place their own
construction on it and so perform, the
court may consider this as persuasive
evidence of what their true intention was.
As recently as in E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v.
Broderick 522 P.2d 144, 145-46 (Utah 1974), this Court cited
Fox Film for its parol evidence holding and stated:
Written words can be examined so as to
ascertain what they stand for in connection
with particular conduct or particular objects.
Thus expressions of the parties prior to and
contemporaneous with the execution of a
written instrument may be helpful in
understanding the meaning of the language
used. However1 the defendant here does not
seek to explain the meaning of a paragraph.
He simply wants the court to eliminate it
in its entirety. This the courts cannot do.
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Appellants have no des·ire to eliminate the ambiguous
portions of the "Thorpe 11 Contract.

Rather, Appellants assert

that the apparent incongruity between paragraphs 6 and 8 of
said agreement becomes obvious upon examination of the
surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time of
contracting.
In their Brief, Respondents attempt to eliminate any
consideration by the Court of the intentions of the parties at
the time of execution of the "Thorpe" Contract.

They deem the

respective balances of the "Pope" Agreement and the "Thorpe"
Contract irrelevant to the conflict at hand.
Brief at 11).

(Respondents'

Conversely, Appellants assert that since the

crux of this case is the applicability of paragraph 8 of the
'iThorpe" Contract to the "Pope" Agreement, a more relevant
piece of evidence could not be imagined than the respective
balances of the two Sales Contracts.
If in fact at the time of its execution (as stipulated
by Respondents (T. 12-13)) , the "Thorpe" Contract balance was
less than the unpaid balance on the "Pope" Agreement, the
intentions of the parties to exclude the "Pope" obligation from
applicability to paragraph 8 are demonstrated and easily
understood.

Had the parties intended to so affect the "Pope"

obligation, Respondents would have requested and Appellants
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would have conveyed title to the subject property immediately.
Instead, the parties commenced a regular course of conduct
whereby the agreements were maintained separately with the
outstanding balances decreasing at different rates of speed.
The apparent conflict between paragraphs 6 and 8
becomes unavoidable with an understanding of the actions of the
parties.

The typed clause ending the acknowledgement of the

"Papen obligation in paragraph 6, "which shall be the Sellers
obligation to pay and discharge" was clearl¥ meant to exempt
that obligation from its applicability to paragraph 8.
Respondents complain that "[t]here is no evidence that the
underlying Pope balance was ever considered in the Thorpe
Contract or that Thorpe or the Plaintiffs had any knowledge
of the balance."

(Respondents' Brief at 11-12).

Appellants

agree with Respondents' complaint; by failing to admit or
consider such evidence1 the District Court erred by granting
Summary Judgment.
B.

UNDISPUTED FACTS DISTINGUISH THE INSTANT
CASE FROM JONES V. HINKLE AND PREVENT A
PROPER GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF ·RESPONDENT.

In their Brief, Respondents assert that the instant
case is "almost identical" to this Court's decision of Jones v.
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980) and attempt to explain away
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important distinguishing facts.

(Respondents' Brief at 12-14).

In doing so, however, Respondents fail to understand that the
bases of dispute in this matter are the specific points which
distinguish this action from Hinkle.
Although the Contract in Hinkle was created from the
same form used for the "Thorpe" Contract, the supplementation
of the "Thorpe" paragraph 6 is unique and stands as the basis
in writing for the ambiguous treatment of the "Pope" obligation.
Appellants and Respondents desiring to demonstrate their intent
not to include the "Pope" obligation in the assumability
provision of paragraph 8, added that said obligation "shall be
the Sellers obligation to pay and discharge."

No such additional

clause is found in the Hinkle Contract.
From a careful reading of the facts in Hinkle, it is
apparent that at the time of execution of that Contract, the
balance of the underlying obligation was well under the
Contract price.

As discussed supra, the comparative balances

at the time of execution of the "Thorpe" Contract, together with
the subsequent actions of the parties, unambiguously demonstrate
that the "Pope" obligation was never meant to be assumed by
Respondents.
Nct~.vi th standing

Respondents' con tent ions to the

contrary, "':he fact that the uPope" Agreement included additional
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properties unincluded in the "Thorpe" Contract is relevant and
material to the contractual intentions of the parties.

Title

to the entire property, subject of the "Pope" Agreement, does
now rest and at all times since the execution thereof has
rested with the Sellers under that Agreement.

Notwithstanding

the provisions of paragraph 8 of the "Thorpe" Contract and
any alleged applicability thereof to the "Pope

11

obligation,

Appellants are without title to convey to Respondents.

It may

by Quit Claim Deed, transfer its interest to said property, but
it cannot convey title which it does not hold.

In this respect

"it would be impractical to attempt to divide title to the
property while the entire title rests with Pope pending
complete satisfaction of the original obligation."

(Respondents 1

Brief at 16).
Related to the above distinguishing problem and
relevant as to the parties original intentions is the matter
of security offered for the "Pope" Agreement by Appellants.
The "unincluded" portion of the "Pope" property and the
additional properties required in the "Pope" Agreement to be
offered by Appellants as security therefore would be unfairly
encumbered by the assumption of the obligation by Respondents.
Extrinsic evidence refused by the District Court would have
shown that the intentions in and purposes of Appellants
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entering into the "Thorpe" Contract concerned to a great
extent the comparative payment schedules of the two Contracts.
By applying the balloon payments from the subsequently
negotiated "Thorpe" Contract directly to the "Pope" Agreement,
said obligation would be satisfied on an accelerated basis
freeing the "other" encumbered properties by as much as 12
years earlier than otherwise scheduled.
While Appellants rely upon none of the above distinguisr
ing factual assertions exclusively as sufficient to require
Summary Judgment to be rendered in Appellants' favor, taken as
a whole, and uncontested as they stand, these specific points
distinguish the present case from Hinkle and require the Court
to examine the contractual intentions of the parties before
rendering judgment.

C.

AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPERLY
REFUSED BY THE LOWER COURT, AND NONE
SHOULD BE GRANTED ON APPEAL.

Although Respondents rightfully take issue with
Appellants' citation of Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and
Investment Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955) for
the proposition that attorney's fees on appea: are

di3cretiona~

with the Supreme Cou=t, Respondents fail to adequately 3nalyze
the District Court's :-::-efusal to award attorney's fees at trial.
Counsel apologizes for its use of the overruled
Swain in its prior Brief, but recognizes an important

-10-
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distinction between Management Services Corp. v. Development
Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980), and the present case.
In Management Services the Court overruled Swain and included
an award of attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party
on appeal, but did so only after the District Court had found
that such an award was proper at trial.
The District Court here found no default committed
by the Appellants requiring an award of attorney's fees.

The

Court merely determined the rights and obligations of the
respective parties.

Any possible default could be committed

only following the reduction of the "Thorpe" Contract to an
amount less than that of the "Pope" Agreement.

At no time did

Respondents demand conveyance of any interest when they were
so entitled, assuming, arguendo, that the "Pope" obligation
was assumable.
In Jones v. Hinkle 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980), unlike
the present case, there were undisputed facts which required
an award of attorney 1 s fees to accompany the Judgment.

There,

both parties agreed that the Hinkle Contract had been paid
down to a balance below that of the underlying obligation.
The Court found that upon Seller's refusal of Buyer's demand
for conveyance, the Seller had defaulted in its obligations,
thus attorney's fees were properly awarded the non-defaulting
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party.

As Respondents did not make their demand at a time

when Appellants might have been required to convey, Appellants
were not found in default.

Therefore an award of attorney's

fees is inappropriate either in the lower Court or on appeal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The action of the lower Court in granting Respondents'
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed.

Based on the

foregoing: analysis, this Court should remand the matter to the
District Court for a trial on the issues concerning the parties'
intentions concerning the paragraphs 6 and 8 of the "Thorpe"
Contract and their respective application to the "Pope"
obligation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

<:("

day of September, 1982.

~(1~
Robert F. Orton
T. Richard Davis
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 521-3800
Attorneys for Respondents
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